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1. Introduction 
 One of the distinctive marks of analytic epistemology is 
its treatment of scepticism about knowledge of the external 
world. If we consider the fundamental role that scepticism had 
always played in traditional theories of knowledge, the 
somewhat secondary role it plays in analytic epistemologies 
will surprise us. The general view within analytic circles 
maintains that knowledge is possible, so that the only 
interesting issue is to find its conditions of possibility 1. 
From this perspective, the task of refuting scepticism does not 
appear as necessary. When scepticism is introduced in the 
discussion, it is as a useful tool to evaluate the 
insufficiencies of different theories in explaining what 
knowledge is. Therefore, the aim is not showing that the 
sceptic is wrong, but showing how he is wrong 2. In short, 
either silence around scepticism, or its use as a 
methodological tool are the immediate consequences of an 
extended view, according to which epistemology would be immune 
against the sceptical challenge. 
 This situation has changed in part during the last years, 
when abundant works about the success or failure of the 
different types of scepticism has appeared, and when the 
importance of dealing with scepticism for the success of any 
theory of knowledge has been accepted 3. But notwithstanding 
the actual proliferation of research about scepticism in 
analytic spheres, there is an issue that has not been properly 
dealt with yet. I mean the discussion about the reasons why 
analytic epistemology has frequently considered scepticism as 
harmless. I think studying the beginnings of analytic 
philosophy can throw some light onto this problem. It is often 
said that analytic philosophy lacks a historical perspective, 
even regarding itself. My essay attempts to contribute to the 
development of such a historical memory, by showing the 
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conceptual line that links the beginnings of analytic 
philosophy with current research about scepticism. In this 
sense, the study of the philosophical position of G. E. Moore, 
one of the fathers of analytic philosophy, illuminates our 
understanding of the displacement of scepticism from its former 
central place in epistemological discussions. 
 
2. Moore's original proposal: the justification of a 
proposition only requires that there is no reason to deny it 
 Moore's epistemological project aims at the following 
objective: to show the validity of everyday or common sense 
beliefs against sceptical claims. Under common sense beliefs he 
understands, for example, the belief that the Earth has existed 
for many years; that there were and are three dimensional 
objects, like the human body; that we are surrounded by other 
people that feel, think and have different experiences; and 
other such beliefs. With this problem in mind, he explores a 
strategy of argumentation which, in my opinion, is new in the 
history of philosophy. Such a strategy consists in saying that 
if there is no reason that justifies denying our common sense 
beliefs, then we are justified in holding them. Thus, 
throughout his writings Moore tries to find a reason to deny, 
for example, that there is an external world. After various 
attempts, he arrives at the conclusion that there is no reason 
to deny the existence of the external world. Hence, we are 
justified in believing its existence. 
 Moore's first two articles - 'The refutation of idealism' 
(1903) and 'The nature and reality of objects of perception' 
(1905-1906) - have not received the attention of many scholars. 
In  my opinion, however, the study of those two articles is 
vital to understand Moore's original strategy of justification, 
for they contain in a nutshell much of what he would later 
develop about scepticism. 
 In effect, a hint of Moore's original approach to the 
justification of our common sense beliefs can already be found 
in his first article 'The refutation of idealism' 4. 
 
 "The question requiring to be asked about material 
things is thus not: What reason have we for supposing 
that anything exists corresponding our sensations? 
but: What reason have we for supposing that material 
things do not exist, since their existence has 
precisely the same evidence as that of our 
sensations?" ('The refutation of idealism', 30). 
  
He then tries to find this reason in his next article 'The 
nature and reality of objects of perception' 5. Where he there 
looks for a justification of our belief in the existence of the 
world, he introduces the notion of justification in terms of 
good reasons: 
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 "A good reason for a belief is a proposition which is 
true, and which would not be true unless the belief 
were also true." ('The nature and reality of objects 
of perception', 35). 
 
Hence, a proposition is a justification for a belief if its 
truth is related to the truth of the belief. Now, what 
proposition can serve as a justification of the belief in the 
existence of the world? In this article, Moore suggests that 
the only way to justifiably believe in the existence of the 
world, is to suppose that the proposition 'There are sense-
contents' is true. 
 
 "If our observation gives us any reason whatever, for 
believing in the existence of other persons <and, 
hence, of the world>, we must assume the existence, 
not only of our own perceptions, thoughts and 
feelings, but also of some ... 'sense-contents'". 
('The nature and reality of objects of perception', 
79). 
 
Hence, the problem of the existence of external world depends 
on whether we can affirm that the sense-data exist. But, can we 
justifiably affirm that the sense data exist? It is precisely 
when answering this question that Moore abandons the 
traditional approach to justification. For Moore tries to 
justify the belief in the existence of the sense-data, not by 
finding a reason to hold it, but rather by showing that there 
are no reasons to doubt it. This new approach to justification 
can be seen in the following two quotes, where Moore asks 
himself: 
 
 "Is there then any reason to think, for instance, 
that none of the colours which I perceive as 
occupying areas of certain shapes and sizes really 
exist in the areas which they appear to occupy?" 
('The nature and reality of objects of perception', 
90) 
 
And he answers: 
 
 "I think it is plain that we have no reason to 
assert, in any case whatever, that a perceived colour 
does not really exist in the place where it is 
perceived as being, unless we assume that that very 
same place really is occupied by something else --
either by some different sensible qualities or by 
material objects such as physical science supposes to 
exist. ('The nature and reality of objects of 
perception', 95). 
 
At this point I need to make some remarks. I have introduced 
Moore's discussion about sense-data only because it is an early 
example of Moore's search for a new kind of justification. But 
my focus in this paper is to show Moore's strategy of 
justification. Therefore, I will put aside all the questions 
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specifically related to sense-data, such as why Moore thinks 
that the existence of sense-data is a reason for the existence 
of the world, or whether his argument against denying the 
existence of sense-data can be accepted.   
 Thus, we have seen how Moore does not want to confirm that 
the sense-contents do exist, but to analyse whether it is 
sensible to suppose that they do not exist. Through this 
strategy, Moore tries to hold the existence of the world 
indirectly: if we lack grounds to justifiably deny its 
existence, that is, if we lack grounds to doubt it, then we are 
justified to affirm it. In other words, only if there are 
reasons to doubt the existence of external reality does it 
makes sense to doubt it. And unless we give these reasons, our 
daily beliefs will not be threatened. With this approach, Moore 
leaves the burden of proof to the sceptic who denies that our 
beliefs in the existence of the world are justified. 
 
3. The thesis of the degrees of certainty 
 The above strategy of justification for common sense 
beliefs is intimately linked to Moore's defense of what I will 
call the 'thesis of the degrees of certainty'. This thesis 
highlight that our beliefs present us with different degrees of 
certainty, and holds that their justification depends on the 
degree of certainty that accompanies them. As a consequence, if 
a certain belief presents us with a higher degree of certainty 
than another belief, then we will be justified in holding the 
former.  
 The thesis of the degrees of certainty has an immediate 
application to the sceptical debate. Thus, a pervasive claim in 
Moore's writings is his insistence that we are less certain of 
sceptical argumentations than of non-sceptical claims. In other 
words, we are more certain of our daily beliefs than of any 
doubt about them 6. According to this thesis, it is not 
necessary to state that our belief in the existence of the 
world is certain, but it is only necessary to show that such a 
belief has a higher degree of certainty than sceptical doubts. 
Examples of the thesis of the degrees of certainty can be found 
throughout Moore's writings. I have chosen one that appears in 
his article 'Some judgements of perception' (1918-1919). 
  
 "This, after all, you know, really is a finger: there 
is no doubt about it: I know it, and you all know it. 
And I think we may safely challenge any philosopher 
to bring forward any argument in favour either of the 
proposition that we do not know it, or of the 
proposition that it is not true, which does not at 
some point, rest upon some premiss which is, beyond 
comparison, less certain than is the proposition 
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which is designed to attack. The questions whether we 
do ever know such things as these, and whether there 
are any material things, seem to me, therefore, to be 
questions which there is no need to take seriously: 
they are questions which it is quite easy to answer, 
with certainty, in the affirmative." ('Some 
judgements of perception', 228). 
 
4. Moore's rejection of scepticism 
 From that strategy of justification and from the thesis of 
the degrees of certainty, Moore derives the following 
conclusion: we do not have reasons to doubt our everyday 
beliefs. Hence, we are justified in holding them. Scepticism 
should not worry us. 
 A further consequence of this kind of argumentation is 
Moore's assertion that our everyday beliefs do not need any 
proof, and correspondingly, that no philosophical argument can 
take away their validity. This view appears, for example, in 
his article 'Hume`s philosophy' (1909). 
 
 "The only proof that we do know external facts lies 
in the simple fact that we do know them. And the 
sceptic can, with perfect internal consistency, deny 
that he does know any. But it can, I think, be shown 
that he has no reason for denying it. And in 
particular it may, I think, be easily seen that the 
arguments which Hume uses in favour of this position 
have no conclusive force. 
  To begin with, his arguments ... depend upon two 
general assumptions. ... And both of these 
assumptions may, of course, be denied. It is just as 
easy to deny them, as to deny that I do know any 
external facts. And if these two assumptions did 
really lead to the conclusion that I cannot know any, 
it would, I think, be proper to deny them: we might 
fairly regard the fact that they led to this absurd 
conclusion as disproving them." ('Hume's philosophy', 
160). 
 
As Moore says three pages after: 
 
 "It would always be at least as easy to deny the 
argument as to deny that we do know external facts." 
('Hume's philosophy', 163).   
 
Moore's strategy is, clearly, a reductio ad absurdum of 
scepticism. Thus, if the sceptical argument concludes that this 
hand does not exist, then something is wrong with the argument.  
 We can now appreciate an important development in Moore's 
approach to justification. In effect, at this point of his 
philosophical career he no longer analyses whether our everyday 
beliefs are justified, but affirms that they are. In this 
sense, the two last articles mentioned, namely, 'Hume's 
philosophy' and 'Some judgements of perception', introduce an 
important theoretical change in relation to the earlier article 
mentioned above, 'The nature and reality of objects of 
perception'. Such a development shows that Moore drew 
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theoretical conclusions from his own philosophical research. 
 
5. Criticisms 
 As expected, Moore's approach gave birth to numerous 
criticisms. A feature common to many of them is the opinion 
that Moore's position was a naive, and therefore, a non-
philosophical way of getting rid of scepticism 7. However, I 
think that such an interpretation of his epistemology must be 
re-examined for the following reasons. 
 First, it is not true that Moore introduces either the 
strategy of justification mentioned above or the thesis of the 
degrees of certainty ad hoc to get rid of scepticism, and that 
he therefore begs the question. On the contrary, Moore gives us 
reasons to defend those approaches as the only way that either 
the epistemologist, or someone who is not an expert in 
philosophical issues, has to justify their everyday beliefs. I 
have shown before how these reasons appear in one of his first 
articles, namely, in 'The nature and reality of objects of 
perception'. I sustain that Moore's confidence in the 
usefulness of both elements to refute scepticism is not ad hoc, 
but the result of previous philosophical analysis where he had 
shown that other strategies of justification inevitably failed.  
 Second, I think Moore's position cannot be judged as naive 
since he realized, either explicitly or implicitly, its 
limitations. Towards the end of his career, and especially in 
the last article he published in life, 'Certainty' (1941/1959) 
8
, he recognized two of the difficulties that his position 
raised. 
 The first difficulty is the lack of a metacriterion to 
evaluate the criterion based on the degree of certainty that 
accompanies our beliefs. Without such a metacriterion, Moore 
would need to accept that it is possible to distinguish beliefs 
which are knowledge from those which are not knowledge by 
introspection and without argumentation. This kind of 
internalism faces, obviously, numerous problems. Moore was 
conscious of the difficulties which he expressed drawing a 
distinction between subjective and objective certainty. 
 
 "There is, therefore, a clear difference in meaning 
between 'I feel certain that ...' on the one hand, 
and 'I know for certain that ...' or 'It is certain 
that ...' on the other. ('Certainty', 239). 
 
 The second difficulty Moore mentioned is the impossibility 
of dealing successfully with the dream-hypothesis. It is worth 
mentioning that in 'Certainty', as well as in his former 
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article 'Four forms of scepticism' (1940-44/1959) 9, Moore 
worked hard to refute the validity of using the dream-
hypothesis to conclude the impossibility of knowledge about the 
external world. His arguments are very interesting, and deserve 
a more detailed study than the one I am able to devote here. 
These considerations notwithstanding, it cannot be forgotten 
that Moore's last claim is the recognition that, unfortunately, 
the dream-hypothesis leaves the door open to scepticism. 
 
 "I cannot see my way to deny that it is logically 
possible that all the sensory experiences I am having 
now should be mere dream-images. And if this is 
logically possible, and if further the sensory 
experiences I am having now were the only experiences 
I am having, I do not see how I could possibly know 
for certain that I am not dreaming." ('Certainty', 
250). 
 
 It might be precisely because Moore recognized these 
difficulties that he did not draw in its entirety the 
theoretical conclusions that could be derived from his 
position. On the one hand, Moore thought that the strategy of 
justification, which consists in pointing out the lack of 
reasons for doubting, and the thesis of the degrees of 
certainty were not only adequate, but the only way to achieve 
justification. But, on the other hand, he was always reluctant 
to accept those strategies once and for all. In effect, 
throughout his writings Moore also explored more classical 
strategies of justification, where he tried to find reasons for 
believing justifiably that there is an external world. This 
fact led to contrasting claims, and explains why in 'A defence 
of common sense' Moore sustained that it was not necessary to 
prove that the point of view of common sense was adequate, 
whereas in 'Proof of an external world' he felt obliged to 
offer proof of the world's existence. 
 
6. Appraisal. 
 It is incompatible to claim that there are no reasons to 
doubt our daily beliefs about the world with other claims that 
try to prove the existence of an external world or to refute 
scepticism. Such movement in two directions is one of Moore's 
weakest points. In my opinion, Moore's project has strength as 
long as he sticks to his original intuition. But, as soon as he 
forgets that which gives his approach its originality and 
novelty, that is, the strategy of justification mentioned above 
and the thesis of the degrees of certainty, he is unable to 
shut the door to scepticism. 
 Despite his ultimate failure, I think Moore's attempt to 
vindicate the validity of our everyday beliefs deserves all our 
respect 10. He belongs to a tradition of thought, one of whose 
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biggest exponents is Hume, which recognizes the existence of a 
clash between the justification of our beliefs in everyday life 
and the justification of our beliefs in philosophical life. 
Moore remained determined to value everyday beliefs above the 
sceptical conclusions of certain philosophical attitudes, 
despite the distinct difficulties he encountered. This is 
precisely Moore's more impressive feature: he never abandoned 
his everyday 'I' when philosophizing. In this sense, the label 
of 'philosopher of common sense', frequently used to refer to 
him, is actually a compliment. 
 Moore inaugurates a new path in contemporary epistemology 
11
. His importance rests in understanding that the habitual 
strategy of looking for an apodictic justification of our 
beliefs through the search for a reason to support them, does 
not lead us very far. He was the first analytic philosopher to 
realize that the only way to defeat scepticism is to approach 
it from a new perspective. It is a perspective that finds a 
firm ground in daily beliefs and builds from them a theory of 
knowledge with deeply anti-sceptical features. Moore's 
epistemological position presented enormous advantages. Taking 
everyday beliefs as inviolable, prevents the epistemologist 
from falling into a pyrrhonic trap. We do not need to argue the 
confidence we have in our beliefs. We know that the world 
exists, and we do not need to prove it. Our only worry should 
be to understand what knowledge is, not whether it is possible. 
This approach interested many epistemologists who came after 
him. 
 
********************** 
COMMENTS: 
 
- Important difference between 'The refutation of idealism' and 
'The nature and reality of objects of perception':  
 In the first article Moore does not introduce the 
existence of sense-data as a hypothesis (according to Miguel), 
while in the second article he does.  
 The explanation of this fact would requiere an analysis of 
the conclusions that Moore draws from 'The refutation of 
idealism'. 
 
- Important difference between 'The refutation of idealism' and 
other posterior articles: In the former article Moore does not 
consider scepticism as absurd, and thinks that scepticism 
cannot be refuted until we find reasons for accepting the 
existence of material objects. Hence, he tries to find these 
reasons in 'The nature and reality of objects of perception' 
and in other posterior articles.  
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- The fact that Moore is an intuitionist in ethics fits into 
his general defence of the thesis of the degrees of certainty 
and of the common sense in epistemology. 
 The problem every intuitionist faces is to determine 
whether or not an intuition is adequate, that is, to 
distinguish true judgments about perception from false ones. An 
intuitionist sustains that there is no criterion to determine 
whether or not certain properties are present. Either you see 
that the object posseses certain properties or you do not see 
it. The consequence is the impossibility of avoiding 
disagreement in epistemological discussions as well as in 
cotidian discussions. 
 
- Moore is not a pragmatist, but there is a way to develop his 
ideas that leads to pragmatism. On the other hand, there is 
Moore's influence on Wittgenstein's 'On certainty'. 
 
- Moore's study can help to indicate the path that needs to be 
follow to answer the dominant view within contemporary 
philosophy where relativism, probabilism and anti-realism (and 
all of them allow for sceptical conclusions) are in fashion.  
 
- Common sense beliefs are not propositions about "relations of 
ideas" but about "matters of fact" (following Hume's 
denomination). 
 
- Since 'The refutation of idealism' one of Moore's unresolved 
problems had been sensorial illusions. 
 
- Moore neutralizes the effects of sceptical argumentations. 
Because he knows he is standing up, he knows he is not 
dreaming. The burden of proof is left to the sceptic. 
 Moore does not follow the sceptic's game, because he 
refuses to say how he knows. He knows that he knows, even if he 
cannot say how he knows. 
****************** 
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